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In the Doran case the 
the last clear chanee doct ne, 
on the that it 
tiou. In the Bessette 
on that doctrine. 
i11strnction \Vas 
therefore the order 
trial in that ease should 
that the 
should have been 
FHA:\ClSCO 481 
should 
evidence was insufficient to 
ehance instruction in either case, and that therefore the order 
affirmed. 'l'he evidence vras sub-
the same in both cases that evidence in 
the light most favorable to 




On 1\iarch 17, 
by defendants' electric overhead 
crossing Union Street at a 
west of the intersection with Fillmore in San !<~ran-
cisco. Plaintiff Jules by plaintiff 
,Jeanne Doran, had his automobile on the south side 
of Union Street, about 100 feet >Yest of Pillmore. Union 
Street is relatively narrow, 44 feet 9 inches from curb 
to curb, and there were cars parked at the curbs on both 
sides. After leaving their car and proceeding west on the 
sidewalk about a car's length, plaintiffs stepped into Union 
Street intending to cross the street to a theatre on the op-
posite (north) side. Defendants' trawling west 
on Union Strert, had crossed Fillmore and in front 
of a drugstore on the northwest corner of the intersection. 
rrhere "·ere two sets of strcrt<:a trar·ks on Union aJ1(1 
the bus was to the curb with its right wheels 
to the right of the most northerly rail of the car tracks. 
Plaintiffs testified that after had into Union 
Street and were a few feet from the south they stopped, 
"looked around," observed the bus stopped to their right 
at the corner but saw no moving traffic, and then proceeded 
straight, not diagonally, aeross the street. ·when reaehed 
tbe center of the street and were between the hvo sets of 
they looked again to the and saw the bus moving 
their direction. \Vhen plaintiff Bessette saw the bus for 
the second time, he ''could not tell if it moyed any distanee 
from the point where he first saw it when it was stopped." 
Plaintiff Doran testified: "\Vnen 1 1-ras in the middle of the 
I don't know how far the bus was from me. I know 
the bus was going in my direction .... I cannot tell you if 
had gone half way. I don't know if it 1vas as close as 10 
44 C.2d~16 
\Vere on 
theatre marquee and lights 
\Yere ahead from his position at 
the corner in front of the the bus driver could see 
cars the full of the block on both sides of the 
street and there \vas nothing in the street to obstruct his 
view. After the bus, he traveled some two or three 
coach lengths coach length i8 85 fe(~t) before he saw plain-
tiffs. He then immediately applied his brakes and swerved 
to the but the front half of the bus struck plaintiffs. 
The bus traveled 4 to 6 feet between the of impact and 
the stop. 'fraveling at the speed of 15 to 20 miles per hour 
when he first saw plaintiffs, he stated that he could stop the 
bus within 23 to 26 including reaction time. He did not 
sound his horn but nsed both hands to turn the steering wheel 
an effort to aYoid striking plaintiffs. He could not state 
he did not see plaintiffs soonrr in the except for 
these preYailing circumstances: plaintiffs were wearing semi-
dark clothing-plaintiff Doran in a dark brown coat, white 
blouse and and plaintiff Bessette in a gray suit 
"sort of brmn1" oycrcoat; the stores on both sides of the 
the corner drugstore and the theatre, both 
>wre dark; and the southerly part of Union 
Street was a dark 1Mekground at approximately the spot where 
he first saw 
[1] It thus appears that the real conflict in the evi-
dence 1vas on the of whether plaintiffs walked straight, 
or ran diagonally, aeross the street and into the path of the 
bus. ' testimony, it will be assumed that 
1valkcd across. But plaintiffs' own testimony 
further showed that they did not stop at any time in making 
such crossing, and that they saw the approaching bus when 
they were at the center of the street. Their own exhibits 
sette's 
DoHAN CrTY & OP 
144 C.2d 477; 283 P.2d 1] 
interval between the 
and the time that the 
accident occurreil. In this situation it understandable that 
plaintiffs should llave admitted that did not know how 
far the bus was from them when the center of 
the street or how many 
center of the street; and in the 
the abovementioned admitted any 
to the effect that the bus was still at the corner 
teet and -vvas just to move at the 
plaintiffs crossed the center of the street is 





accident. Such testimony therefore cannot be deemed to be 
substantial evidence on that subject. 
[2] '\Vhether or not the doctrine of last elear chance 
applies in a particular case depends wholly upon the rxistence 
or nonexistence of the elements necessary to it into play. 
Th0 doctrine presupposes: "(1) That has been 
neg·Iigent as a result thereof, is in a of 
from 1vhich he cannot esc-ape by the exercise of 
and this includes not only where it is physically 
for l1im to escape, but also in rases where he is 
of his danger and for that reason unable to escape; 
defendant has knowledge that the- is :in such a situa-
and kno1vs, or in the exercise of ordinary care should 
know, that plaintiff cannot escape from such situation; and 
has the last clear chance to avoid the accident by exer-
cising ordinary care, and fails to ex0rcise the same, and the 
accident results thereby, and plaintiff is injured as the 
mate result of such failure." (Daniels v. City & 
San supra, 40 Cal.2d G14, 619.) [3a] If any one 
of these elements the doetrine dors and 
the doetrine is not 







in the path of 
after leaving 
and saw the bus 




within the of 
to a11swer defendants' eontention re-
apparently 
were iu a position 
impossible" for 
the center of the 
into the of the oncoming 
upon their claim that they 
their 'l'his latter claim 
finds no in the Pvidence. Plaintiffs concededly knew 
of the prrseuce of tlw bus 11s they started to cross the street, 
and also knew that it \Yas moving toward them when they 
again lookPd to the \Yhile near the center of the rela-
t llalTO\Y street. \Vith this they proceeded 
to step tl into the of the oncoming bus; and in 
t hr it cannot be said that 
nmrwan'lwss of 
JJUt exist \\'here 
of an 
the eollision and the11 
other direction ~while 
[5] 'rotal 
the doctrine, does 
party is fully aware of the 
vehicle up to the instant before 
attention to look in some 
direetly into its path. 





to any comparable factual 
, in a case which is closely parallel 
it ,,-as held that the doctrine was not applicable. 
191 Cal. 696.) There the plain-
the eurb, glanced to her 
ckfendani automobile approaehing at a 
200 feet. Slle started to cross the 
stn•ei <llHI when she 
she a;.win 
automobile still 
had takPn two or thrre from the 
to her right and saw defendant's 
of course, nearer. \Vithout 
doctrine 
there was evidence to 
fa et " 
Oil , the eourt found 
11pon suffieient cridcnce that "up to the time of tl1e collision, 
he did not see and oblivious of the 
approf!ch of the and the 
(P. 200.) ln Cen/ct· v. fellow Cab 
P .2cl 918], the cvidenc·e sh<rwed that the iff "did not 
see the of nw automobile that struck him " . 206.) 
Ancl in t}w more reeent drcision of Peterson v. Burkhalter, 
88 Cal.2d 107 [237 P.2d 977], there was evidrnce to shovv 
that the injnrcd boy did not sec the defendallt 's oneomillg 
autornobile. 1'he in ntersPction on his 
motor scooter and "·hile 7i) feet therefrom over 
his right shoulder in the as he 
neared tlw iutrrscctiou he "was still 
shoulder." . 109.) Other eases cited 
situations where there ~was eYidenee to show that the vrl1icle 
in which the injnrecl was either stalled 
or stopped 
was traveling. 
(i43]; Daniels 'T· City & of San 
40 Cal.2d GH: Sills Y. Los Transit 
GBO 1_255 P.2d .) It thus appears that in each of tlw 
eited e<JS!'" there was evideucc from Yrhieh the trier of tbc 
faets cou1r1 ftnr1 that plaintiff's }Jad placed bim 
i11 a of from which he (·onld not escape by 
the exercise of ordinary care either ( 1) becan"ie it was 
"physiea11y impossible for him to escape" or because 
he was "totally 1111aware of his aud for that reason 
nnable to eseape." Under sueh there was no 
laek of t>VidcJH'(~ to s11pport a finding of the prrsenee of the 
first n'qllif'c(l (·lr'llH'llt for the of the last clear 
the recent 
that some 
cases have '' the suffi~ 
of the of the 
doctrine." v. supm, 39 Ca1.2d 297.) 
It was further stated in the earlier case of Girdner v. Union 
Oil supra, 216 Cal. 197, 202-203, that any "apparent 
eonfuflion which exists in some of the decisions upon the 
arises in tlw application of the law to the facts, but 
as to the rule itself there is little or no confusion.'' A sum-
mary of the rnles established by the recent cases may serve 
to any confusion that may be said to exist 
reason of certain earlier decisions. 
The presenting the issues of negligence and 
is governed by the traditional rules 
whieh eovrr those and which make contributory negli-
gence a bar to recovery by the injured party. [6a] 'l'he last 
clear chance vvhich relieves an injured party of the 
results of his O>Yn contributory and permits him 
to recover such negligence, is applicable only in the 
exceptional case in which there is substantial evidence to 
a favorable finding on each of the several required 
elements above enumerated. [3b] And as above indicated, 
if any one of these el .. ments is absent, the doctrine does not 
apply and the case is governed by the ordinary rules of negli-
gence and contributory negligence. (Palmer v. '.Tschudy, 
supr·a, 191 Cal. 700; Rodabaugh v. 'l'ekus, supra, 39 Cal. 
2d 293; also Girdner v. Union Oil Co., su.pra, 216 Cal. 
197, 202; Daniels \T. City & Connty of San Francisco, supra, 
40 Cal.2d 614, 619; Sills v. Los Transit Lines, supra, 
40 Cal.2d 630, 635.) [7] In this connection, it should be 
that the "continuing negligence" of the injured 
does not deprive him of the benefit of the last clear 
chance doctrine if all the required elements for the application 
of that doctrine are present, for such "continuing negligence" 
ordinarily exists in all last clear chance cases. (Girdner v. 
DoRA]'{ CrTY & CouNTY oF SAN 
[ 44 C.2d 477; 283 P.2d 1] 
Union Oil supra, 216 CaL 203 
Cab supra, 216 CaL 207-208 
supra, 38 CaL2d 104-105; Peterson 
38 CaL2d 111.) 
[8] 
in a 
of lavv; and the absence such 
is error for the trial court to instruct the 
that doctrine. (WaUis v. So1dhern Pac. 
487 
Yellow 
672 [195 P. 15 A.L.R. 117] ; supra, 
39 Cal.2d 290, 297; Johnson v. Sa.cramento Northern Ry., 
54 543 [129 P.2d 503] 
73 Cal.App.2d 427, 431-432 [166 P.2d [9] On the 
other hand, if there is such substantial conflicting 
or thr of whether the defendant should 
be held to haYe 1wd a last clear chance to avoid the accident 
IS a of fact to be determined by the under 
appropriate iustructions. v. Union Oil supra, 
216 Cal. 197, 204: Center v. Yellow Cab supra, 216 Cal. 
205, 208; v. Olsen, snpra, 38 Cal.2d 102, 106; Peter-
son v. Burkhalter, supra, 38 Cal.2d 107, 113; Daniels v. C·ity 
& County of San F'ra1w1:sco, supra, 40 CaL2d 619, 622-
623; Sills v. Los 'l'ransit supra, 40 Cal.2d 
630, 635-636, 638.) 
·while the determination of the of law above-
mentioned is not free from difficulty in certain borderline 
cases, the cited authoritiPs show that the courts haYc not 
hesitated to hold that the doctrine could be applied wheneYer 
it may be fairly said that there is substantial con-
flicting or otherwise, upon which to base a of the 
presence of each of the required elements. (6b] These au-
thorities recognize, however, that it is only the exceptional 
case to which the doctrine may be applied, and that the mere 
fact that there is ample eyidence to show that a defendant 
is negligent, without substantial evidence of the existence of 
the other required elements, will not warrant the application 
of the last elear chance doctrine. (Rodaba.ngh v. Tekus, 
supm, 39 Ca1.2d 290, 293.) 
[10] The underlying basis for the application of this 
doctrine, which permits an injured person to recover despite 
his continuing and col!tributory negligence, is that defendant 
was afforded a last chance and a clear chance to avoid the 
accident after defendant had discovered that plaintiff was 
488 
accident that neither party may 
last clear chance to avoicl 
39 Cal.2d 290, 
136 Cal.App. 22:1, 
; Johnson v. Sacramento Nm·thern Ry .. 
542.) 
the it is helpful to bear 
in mind the deeisiom; ~which rationalize the last clear chance 
doctrine in terms of eause. ( Oirdner v. Union Oil 
Co., supra, 2Hl CaL 1!17, 204; Center v. Yellow Cab Co., 
sttpra, 216 Cal. 207-208; v. Redinger, ante, 
p. 121 P .2d . ) ;\s vvaH said in the Center 
ease at pages 207 -~~08 : "The doctrine of (plaintiff's) con-
has no unless the is 
cause of the injury. [13] If all the clements of 
the cloctt·inc the last clear chance are and plaintiff's 
becomes remote in then the cloctn:ne 
If, on the other any of ihe elements oE the 
courts have and rightfully so. 
continuous and contributory 
~with that of defendant bars a recoyery." (Emphasis added.) 
rrhus, the doetrine may be applied only if it may fairly 
be said that plaintiff's was "remote in eansa-
tion.'' [14] ~What then is the main factor whieh may malu' 
plaintiff's in the eyes of the law, a remote eausr 
rather than a cause of the aeeident? It is obYionsly 
the existenee of some such interval after the 
time that intiff has reachrd a state of helplessness as to 
enable defem1ant to aetual of plaintiff's state 
of aml to have a last c.lear chance to avoid the 
sneh stale of hdplrssness 
48D 
ng of the 
intl'rYal therrafter as to enable defendallt 
10 's and to have a 
last clear chance to RYoid the accident. In such ease, the 
to be ''remote in of i ntiff cannot be deemed 
eausal.ir,JJ." Ou the eontrary, t;Uch 
eyes of the law, a cause of 
last ckar chance doetrine has 
m the 
and the 
In the light of the above it appears clear that 
the cases inYolved on this no substantial 
evidence upou which to applieation of the last 
clear cha!lCe doetrine. \Ve llaYc heretofore indicated that 
there was 110 eYidence to show that plaintiffs 'Were totally 
Hnaware of the . for testified that saw the 
bus twice afln the south curb-first 
after lNtvlng the south curb and ~when in 
the center of the strec•t. Jt is also clear that cannot 
sncc:•,c:;.~fully claim that defewlants had a last clear chance 
i o avoid the accident had left their position 
center of the street awl into a 
Plaintiffs \\ere not in a position 
of helplessness, \rithin the meaning 
had reached a point where they 
no escape by the exercise of ordinary care. 
As \Yas said iu Dalley v. Williams, supra, 73 Cal.App. 
at page 435, "tfH~ term 'place of safety' ordinarily 
includes the position of the plaintiff while he is merely 
the place of and so long as he is only 
but is not in a position of danger, the 
cannot invoke the doctrine.'' 
[16b] 'l'he distance from the center of the street to the 
north i·nrb was bnt 22 feet inches. There \Wre anto-
mobiles alomt the c11rb, thus leaving the inter-
spnee for the to operate along the northerly half 
IJf the• where the accident occurred at a point within 
490 . CITY & Cou:qy OF SA~ l<'RAxcrsco [44 C.2d 
center line of tlw street. Plaintiffs' 
created by tlwir ad of 
m•ar the center of thi~ street and 
the of Under any view 
could not have taken more i han 
after leaving a of safety and before 
rrherefore plaintiffs' act of negli-
of and stepping directly into 
bus necessarily occurred almost. 
happening of the accident. Under 
these snch negligence cannot be deemed "re-
mote in '' and it cannot be said that defendants 
thc·reafter had a last clear chance to avoid the accident. We 
therefore conclude that in each of these cases the trial court 
determinc•d the challenged rnling that as a matter 
of law the record presented no substantial evidence to justify 
the of the last clear chance doctrine. 
affirmed. 
& Connty of San Pmncisco, S. I~. 19190, 
a new trial is affirmed. In Bessette v. City 
San Prancisco, S. l~. 19191, the judgment is 
Edmonds, J., and Schauer, J., concurred. 
CAHTEH, J.-I dissent. 
I cannot agree 'With the majority opinion for several reasons. 
'rhe first of these reasons is that the facts have not bPen fairly 
stated. ln the propriety of the order granting 
a new trial and of the refusal to give a requested jury instruc-
tion in these eases, the eYidence is to be viewed in the light 
most fa yorable to plaintiffs. (Rodabmtgh v. Tekus, 39 Cal.2d 
290 [246 P.2d 663]; Daniels v. City & County of San Pmn-
40 CaL2d 614 [255 P.2d 785].) The appeal in these 
(:ascs is presented on settled statements of facts submitted 
plaintifts with amendments proposed by defendants. The 
from the settled statements, quoted in the majority 
appear to be the excerpts least favorable to the 
plaintiffs and most f<worable to defendant. In some instances 
the excerpts attributed to plaintiff Doran have been taken 
from the statement snbmitted by plaintiff Bessette. They 
do not appear in the settled statement of facts submitted by 
plaintiff Doran. 
TESTIMONY OP BESSET'I'E 
From the testimony of plaintiff Bessette as it appears in 
the settled statement of facts, the majority opinion quotes: 
. ] DoHAN CITY & Coul'\TY OF SAx 
[44 C.2d 477; 283 P.2d 1] 
·when he " ... saw the bus for the second 
not tell if it moved any distance from the 
first saw it when it >ms stopped' " Read in tlw 
the majority opinion, these 1vords seem to 
Bessette did not know where the 
when he sa-w it the second time. That 
be the basis for the Jater statement of 




lmew that the bus \Vas to·ward them wJ1rn 
reached the center of the street. Head in the eontext in 
which it was submitted to this conrt in the settled statements 
of facts, this excerpt conveys a far different Com-
pare the \Yords quoted in the 
which appear in the same o;cttlec1 
facts as the testimony of plaintiff 
opinioll apparently ignores: 
"\Ve ·walked about 6 or 7 feet into the strrct. 
then stopped to look for traffic. \Ve s<nr 
traffic in either direction, but saw the bus at tll~· 
rorner near the drugstore, with the back whrel of the bus 
into the intersection. The visibility vms and 
when I looked to my left (west) I was able to src beyond 
Stein0r Street, and was able to see the houses up there." 
"\Ve proceeded across the street and when I reached near 
the center of the street I noticed that the bus was begin-
ning to move from the stopped 1t 'don' ' go 
at all, it just beginning to move.' (Sic) I continued 
across, going straight, not diagonally, and I don't remember 
"·hat happened after that." 
"When I was in the middle of the street 1 looked to my 
right to see the bus, what the bus was 
corner. As far as I could sec, the bus was 
to move." 
'' 'l'l1e last time I saw the bus it was northw0st of Fillmore 
near the front of the drugstore. \Vhen the bns was 
starting to moYe, it \Yas right thrre in the same place that 
I was looking the first time. I neyer saw the bus after that. 
I know I vvas walking to the middle of street but after that 
I don't know what happened to me. ·when I was at the 
center of tlJe street I didn't stop but eontill1Jet1 to wulk. I 
know I was past t1H~ middle of the street >vhen the aeeident 
occurred but I don't know how far past." 
"\Vhcn he "IYas looking' at the bus again to se~' what tlJP 
bns was doing when he reached the center of the street ana 
OF SA'< PRA'<m,.;co 144 C.2d 
''ernwd to him ilmt be ha.d 
"Port 's i given his 
were read into the reeord in which he said: 'I did not see 
the bus befm·c it l1it mP.' fTp ean hov.- f:ll· lw lwd 
walked from his wn m the l~enter of the strePt np to 
the knock;•l] 0111-, he doesn't kuow." 
"He did not bell or 
other 
''That 
at 1 hr tinw 
' ~ ' 







tornPr, it \\·as abont 20 or 12;1 feet away from whPre lw 
to look for 1 railit· ·when he was ahon1 G or 7 
fl•et ont from the south enrb. '' 
"\Vlwn he to the micl<lh• of the strert ltl' loukrcl to thl' 
and saw the bus ; he could not tell if it mowd 
aay distance from the point where he first saw when it 
\Y<lS " 
"\Vhen he looked at the bus a seeond time it was about 
120 to 125 feet from him. Prom the time he left the side1Yalk 
until the time he got to the center of the street the bus hadn't 
moyed any distmwe at it was still in the same 
right then• at the eorner." 
"I kne>Y the bns 1rns in my direction but I c1id 
uot alter the of my >Yalk because I hacl of 
the bus was so far I took my eyes off the bus and 1 never 
l<loked at it to see -what \Vas 1 o it." 
"\Vhrn he the center of the street am1 saw t hr 
bns start to moYe, he never lookPd in the dirt'ction from whicli 
and neYer looked at the bus again.'' 
c-lear that the brief of plaintiff 
Be"sette's in the majority opinioll is llOt 
tenor of his tesiimony. 
as it is in tbe 
it is to 
eonld }mye found. lt 
vit>w of the evidence in the 
'I' he 
was eom 
h(riN far a way it was, and 
Tbe evidc•11ee Yiewec1 as a whole indicates to 
a 
to plaintiff. 
kllew the bus 
eart>) 





tlw e<;l'll('f'. 120 
from me. 
l know the bus in my (Urection .... I cannot tdl 
you if it l1ad gone half 1 don't know if it \Yas as close 
as 10 feet to me when I s<nr it the second time. As I was 
the street. I know the bus was 
tion but I don't lmow whether the bus was 
\nmld eoutinue to go 
fitop or 
Let us this one sentence at a and 
eompare it ·with othl•r excerpts from the sauw settled stat<'-
nwnts. 'f11C• first se11terwe 
is '' 'VheJJ ! was in the middle 
lhlW far the bus 1ras from me.'' This sentence 
in the settled statement of facts submitted 
plaintiff Bessette. ft did not appear in the settled statement 
of facts -;ubmitted by plaintiff Doran. the 
sentence with these referring to the same sub-
matter, whiclJ the apparently 
'' \Ylwn we reached the middle of thP street bc•tweeu the 
l wo Sl'ts of tracks I lookrd to the ) and saw 
the bus in about the same 
in my direction.'' 
"T sa\Y the bus a second time when I was about the middle 
of the stn·(~t. The bus was in the same ion mostly 
::\Ir. Brssette on my " 
"Before we got i o the middle of the street I was looking 
and \Yhen I was in the middle of the street I >vas looking 
the bus." "'l'he bus started to moYe when 
l 1vas about in the middle of the street. After I started 
across the street ·whrn I saw the bus down at the corner 
I next looked to see where the bus was when I was in the 
middlr. After tbat I dicln 't look any more." 
Tlw infrreuce which thr (lra>vs from the 
sentence it, is that plaintiff Doran did 110t know 
how far away the bus was. 'rhe inferenee logieally to b1~ 
drawn from the wholP is tlwt plaintiff Doran did 
kunw abol!t how far away the bus was--she lDH'w that it was 









reached the middle of the street between the 
looked to the right and sa'\v 
to move 
in my direction. " 
''Wlwn I looked the second time the bus was moving. 1 
can't tell how close it was to me. I don't know if it 
had the of the nearest corner.'' 
The inference "Which the majority apparently draws from 
the tenee which it quotes is that plaintiff Doran saw tlw 
bus at fn1l speed down the street toward her. 'l'he 
evidence viewed as a whole will not support that inference. 
inference which may be drawn from the whole 
is that plaintiff Doran saw the bus still at the corner, 
120 feet away, beginning· to move. 
'l'he third and fourth sentences in the quoted paragraph 
of the majority opinion were "I cannot tell you if it had 
golle half way. 1 don't know if it was as close as 10 feet 
to me when I saw it the second time." Of the quoted para-
these are the first senteHccs which actually do appear 
in 1 he settled statement submitted by plaintiff Doran. But 
eompare them 'With these words, which also appear in plain-
tiff Doran's statement and which the majority ignored: 
''When we reached the middle of the street between the 
two sets of tracks I again looked to the right (cast) and saw 
the bus in about the same position [about 120 feet away], 
move in my direction.'' 
'"l'he bus was in the same position mostly [about 120 feet 
and Mr. Bessette was on my right.'' 
"The bus started to move [from its position at the corner 
about 120 feet away] when I was about in the middle of 
the street." 
rfhe majority picks OUt isolated SClltcnces which imply that 
plaintiff Doran did not know how far away the bus was; 
but the majority ignores the many statements in the record 
ihat indicate that plaintiff Doran did know that the bus 
was about 120 feet away when she was at the middle of the 
street. 
The last sentence in the quoted paragraph is ''As I was 
DORAN v. CITY & COU::\TY OF SAX FlMNCIS<:O 495 
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I know the bus was 
but I don't know whether the bus was 
continue to go along.'' Again, there is 
in the settled statement submitted 
in my dir0ction 
to or would 
does not seem to be any direct reference in the statement 
submitted Doran as to 
of "whether the bus ·was going to 
go along.'' 
All of these purportedly of 
Doran's were culled by the majority from the state-
ment of facts submitted by plaintiff BE>ssette. I cannot under· 
stand how, if the majority opinion was guided the eon-
trolling principle that thE' evidence is to be viewed in the 
light most favorable to plaintiffs, it cou 1d have such 
statements as I have quoted above. On the same page of 
the Bessette statement that the majority quotes plaintiff 
Doran as saying, "vYhen I was in the middle of the street 
I don't know how far away the bus was from me," appears 
the statement "vYhen I was in the middle of the street I 
saw the bus just beginning to move.'' Can it possibly be 
said that the majority views the eYidence in the light most 
favorable to plaintiffs? Can it be said that the facts have 
been fairly stated? I think not. 
The majority paints a word picture of plaintiff Doran 
walking to the middle of the street, seeing a large bus bearing 
down on her, apparently quite close, and blandly 
in front of it with no idea whether it would stop or not. This 
picture is but a sadly distorted remnant of the original por-
trayal which appeared in the evidence. A clearer view shows 
plaintiff Doran ·walking to the center of the street; seeing 
the bus about 120 to 125 feet away, beginning to move; 
and continuing across the street vdth a feeling of apparent 
safety; only to be struck down by the bus which rapidly 
coYered the intervening distance. 
TEsTil\IONY oF THE Bus DRIVER 
The testimony of the bus driver is summarized in the 
majority opinion somewhat accurately. Minor discrepancies 
in the majority's summary include (1) " ... he was trav-
eling between 15 to 20 miles per hour when he :first saw 
plaintiffs .... " The testimony was that he was traveling 
20 miles per hour when he first saw them. (2) "TraYeling 
at the speed of 15 to 20 miles per hour when he first saw 
plaintiffs, he stated that he could stop the bus within 23 
the purpose 
\Vllatevc•r· it was JJe(~rs­
'l'hat the hus 
np the whole st ( 
np from the he could see and left and 
in front. 'l'hat all of the up to the tinw of 
he was ahead. 'fhat cars wen• outline(\ 
dearly <llld he had no trouble in them. ) He 
1Jac1 a fie1d of vision Yision) and 20-20 
vision. Thrsc ' testimony 
that whrn \Yere iu the the bus 
\Yas still at the corner, to move, could quite 
lead to tlle inference that the bus driwr saw the 
G46 
I G6 ) . 
would be little troubl<~ in clear ehanc,, 
doctrine is that infcrenee eould be dravvn. 
anrl vwuld be upheld on since there is evidentiary 
support for it. A wonld not be bound by the direct 
of the dcfewlant driver. Even less bound by 
defewhmt 's >Ye, who are supposed to be viewing 
the e\'i\lrnte most favorable to plaintiffs. 
Tlw majority states that the only real conflict in 
the eYic1enee \Yas on the of whether plainti!Ts walked 
siraight, or ran across the street. Having set 
up this (]efenscless ":straw man," the majority then strikes 




as reqnired by law. 
Y. Tckus. supm; Daniels v. City & County 
I DonA'.'" v. CrTY Co!'XTY 0!•' SA 407 
f 44 C.2d 477; 283 P.2d 1] 
feels that it 
the more Tire 
comnwnees 1vith the above mentioJJed cOJTeet 
eoJJtinurs 1vith a distortion of the facts 
seeks to prove that "there could not 
interval between the time 
of and the time that 
the aeeicknt oecurrecl." l:"r·om the eonJliet evidence in 
1 !w assume'; that tlw aceiilent oe1:1!1Ted 
about () feet from the center of the street. lh·om this one. 
isolated itself 1ras eontradictrrl tiH· dired 
who te:;:tified thai to t hr best 
six or seven afi er 
dte <:enter of the street before he was the 
attempiR to proY(' a measnre of timr by nse of a statement of 
linear mcae<m·cnwnt. To prove that no appr. ciable time 
while took the six or seven Bteps, it would 
br~ necessary to kumv the rate of at 1vhieh intiff\ 
The only direct r•Yidence of the rat'' of 
of ' \Yalk is the that werP 
walk, and that they didn't lmny, 
or slow l1rnn1 ·while the r;treet. 'fhe facts from 
which their rate of speed conld be inferred are the facts that 
Bessette >ras 7 4 years and that there 1nrc- street-
ear tracks in the street. Fr<;m tbrse facts it eou1d lw i11ferre(1 
i hat an \Yalk for Bessette b:~ slower 
walk for a younger, more agile yonth. 
110 evidenee in the record as to the y or 
Clearly, the majority \Yas forced to 
un-vvarranted the re·cord in order io 
''llppol't the decision which it had ly (1eterminrd it 
wa~ to reach. 
Continning >Yith the same paragraph, the opiuioll 
states: "In this situation it is HJI(1erstamlable tlw; 
should have admitted that they did not h10w hrrw far the 
lmR was from them IYhen were at the ePnter of thn street 
or hlrw many th('Y to0k after ihe eenter of tlle 
;;;(n:et; all(l in the light of tlwse admissio11s alld ihc ahoYe-
mentioned 1Hhnitted facts~ any of ilfs t') the 
effect tlwt the bus was still at the corner (a bout 120 feet 
away) and \\·as to moyc at thr· 1 ime that plain-
tiffs cross1.•d the CPnier of the stre(•t is iwprobahlP 




in order to 
arci~rnt occurred 
t lw street. T snhmit 
ablr> in t 
vnnll'L J ~0 fct'i mn1y, 
,.;j red. 'l'hc eYi<1cll~:e 
started i lH' bus 
tlw i1oor and that the bns rr•aehed the of 20 miles an 
hour before hitting iffs. 'l'herc is not h the evl-
(lcnce to indicate that the bns 11l'iver took his fout 
accelerator until 
i1Hlication in the n·i<len<·c of tlw 11wxin1 
mathematicnl 
a bn~ 20 mi]('S per hour IYill eoY<'r i 
120 to 12;) feet in le~c; thm five sccolH1s. 
H llmYiug a reasonable time for ac-celeration. it \Yonld 
possiblr for thr hlls to coyer the d ;nwr from the ('Ol'ner to 
thr; of in not more than 
mHl tl1at it \Yonl(1 be 
a 74-ycar-old man. to take six or sen'n seeom1s to >Yalk SlX 
•n· seven across the streetcar !raeks. may I ask, 
ean the fincl inhen•nt in su<•h testi-
lllOlJY? It nm do so by bl dis-
inferPllC'('S and dec1nctiom; the 
<'-;·idelH·e \l'hic·h has br•en 
b.\~ at 1eust seYen 
t }w record in the Doran case. 
The rule has been settled in this s1ai e that contradic-
tions in the 1 esj imony of H even if the witness is the 
4B9 
over 
credible witnesses; and the mere 
circumstances make the story of the 
witnesses srem will not justify a reversal by an 
tribunal upon the that the verdict is contrary 
to the evidence. v. 46 CaLApp. 493, 498 
!189 P. 471 I ; see also Postier v. 121 Cal.App.2d 98 
. ) 
123 Cal.App.2d 853 [268 
47 CaLA.pp.2d 832 [119 
52 Cal.App.2d 255 [126 
60 Cal.App.2d 125 [140 P.2d 
STATEl\fEXT OF PACTS 
.tl.s stated do not believe that the facts are fairly 
stated in the op1mon. The summary of the facts 
to which the opinion applies the law could con-
be drawn from the submitted statements, but it is 
not a Yiew of the evidence most favorable to 
It is not cnm an impartial view of the evidence. 
l t is a view of the eYidence most favorable to defendant. 
different vrnions of the facts could be drawn from the 
settled statements of facts submitted by the plaintiffs. I 
propose that lYe a version as favorable to the plaintiffs 
as the eyidence ·will reasonably allow. 
On March about 7 :30 p. m., plaintiffs were struck 
defendant's electric overhead trolley bus as they were 
;)()O 
Union Stn•et 
from to curbs 
on both sides. west 
Oll the sid('lvalk a bout a ear's intu 
Street to cross the street to a th(•ater 011 
the side. walked a fe\Y into 
1 he and looked both ways for traffic. 
saw no moving traftie in either bnt on their right, 
-;aw defewlant 's bus, at the eorner of 
Cnim1 and Fillmore on the ·west side of 
about 20 to 125 feet a\Yay from where stood. The sun 
had gone cl\r\YH and it ·was nighttime, bnt the 
trw street well They resumed walking 
aeross the street. \Vhen reached the middle of the street, 
both again looked to the to sec ·what 
tlie bus was It ,,·as still at or near the corner, about 
1:20 feet away, but had begun to move. Believing that 
had plenty of time to cross, took their eyes off 
tlw bus, looked ahead and con tin ned a eros" 
1 lw ~treet. They did not stop at the center of the street, 
bnt looked to the while walking. 
the bus driver, \Yho had 20~20 Yision and 
had si arted 1 he bus the al~cd~ 
('rator all the way to the floor. He was 
in the clireetiou of 1n•re JJO ubstruc~ 
tions to his vie\\'. There \YilS JJO from the insi(le lights 
to interfere \Yith his view. \Wre 011 low 
but this 1n1s adequate to see all that was necessary to 
be seeu for operation of the b11s. 'l'he lights lit up the ·whole 
street from curb to t:nrb. He drovr straight ahea(l ui1til ht~ 
was within 15 or 20 feet of plaintiffR, at whieh time he pushed 
on tht• brake and turned the wheels to the left. 'fhe 
right front side of the bus struck plaintiffs, and the bus 
(~ontinued for about 8 feet after the impaet before it canw 
to a stop. 'I'he of impact \Vas about six or seven 
north of the centiT of i he strePt, where plaintiffs last looked 
to owr• the bus at the eonwr. 'fhe bus driver admits that he 
did not S011lll.l hiR horn and that he did JJOt apply his brakes 
when l1e first saw the plaintiffs, but he claims that he did 
not sre them until he \Yas 15 or 20 feet away from tl1em. 
FRA"<CfSCO GOI 
APrr~rcATrox oP CLEAR CHANCE DocTRINE 
\Vith this statement of the facts in let us proceed to 
a discussion of the of the last clear chance doc-
trine. The last is applicable in very 
cases. 'l'he case now before this is one of those few 
\Yhether not the doctrine 
out the 
or nonexistence of certain factual elements. 
has set out the nature of those 
factual clements. \Vhat remains is to see 1vhether or not 
those elements are in this case. 
Defendants contend that the doctrine is not applicable here 
beeanse were aiYare of their position and 
could haYe saved themselves by the exrrcise of ordinary care. 
Plaintiffs may have been nrgligent in the street in 
Jl1e middle of the block wlwn 1h('re were marked crosswalks 
Ht the end of tlJe block. Bnt it does not follow that they 
werr aware of any danger from the bus. They saw it stopped 
at the corner, walked to the middle of the narrow street, 
looked again and saw it still at the corner, just beginning to 
move. They did not look at it again, believing they had 
plenty of time to cross. They took six or seven more steps 
and were hit. Awareness of the fact that a bus 120 feet away 
is ng to moyc• docs uot eonstit nte mYareness of the 
danger which actually \vas present. If it did, every pedes-
trian who crosses a street would be in a constant state 
of H\'.~arenrss of imminent sinec 1 l.ere is usually some 
traffic moving· toward one when he crosses a street. The 
evidence in this case, viewed reasonably, clearly shows that 
plaintiffs were totally unaware of any danger. 
'rhe majority opinion erronrously assumes that plaintiffs 
wc·rr '' aware of the approach of an oncoming vehicle 
np to thr instant brforc tl1c collision .... " The majority 
seems to believe that the plaintiffs were bent on suicide. It 
intimates that the plaintiffs saw the bns right on top of 
them and blithely ignored it as tlwy stepped into its path. 
No reasonable reading of the evidrnr:c could give that im-
The ease of Palmer v. Tschudy, 191 CaJ. 696 [218 P. 36], 
which the describe~ as "f:losely parallel on 
to this case, because :it is elear1y 
clistingnislwble on its faets. I agt·ee with tl1r learned ;justiees 
of tlw Distriet Court of Appeal, who stated in their decision 
that thr Palmer case \Yas not applicable to this case ((Cal 
tion], was held in Daniels v. 
[ , not to where the driver 
of the fact that the other person is 
path." There is the additional factnal 
Palmer case, that the had audible 
approach of the 
his horn. No horn was sounded here. 
Other cases which the 
tinguishes (Girdner v. Union oa 
915] ; Center v. Yellow Cab Co., 216 Cal. 
Peterson v. Burkhalter, 38 Oa1.2d 107 
all applicable to the extrnt at least that 
who is totally unaware of the 
in a position of from which he 
exercise of ordinary care; that it need 
possible for him to escape in ord0r to 
quirement. 
It is interesting to note that the 
summary of the "facts" near the conclusion of the nnn";r.n 
states that plaintiffs were in of 
center of the and not in a of 
thought that this 
r"ily & of supra, 40 CaL2d 
where the same writer held that the 
of danger even though not 
bns, bnt only 
Daniels case was made in 
point. 
On the question of whether defrndant had 
the were in a of and knew 
ncar the 
I had 
have known that plaintiffs could not escape, the evidence 
clearly would support an inference that the driver saw 
CITY COT'XTY OF SAc; FRA:'\CISCO 503 
C.2d 477; 283 P.2d 1l 
125 fret away from them. The 
that be did not see them look in 
no comment should be 
proximately 
OPINION 
opinion is that 
the erroneous and 
on the last clear chance doctrine, 
''The question of whether there 
conflicting or other·wise, -vvhich 
of the last clear chance doctrine 
ol' law; and iu the n hsence of 
for the trial court to instruct the 
that doctrine. [Citations.] On the other 
there is such substantial evidence, conflicting or 
the ol' whether i.he defendant should be 
held to have had a last clear chance to avoid the accident is 
of fact to be determined by the jury under appro-
instructions. [Citations. J '' 
I know of test for determining whether or not 
there is an issue 1vhich slwuld be submitted to a 
jury for its and that is the so-called "reason-
able minds'' test. I have never heard another test suggested 
and I know of 110 other basis for determining this question. 
In this test it would seem that when a trial court 
concluded that an issue of fact exists, and submits such 
issue to a and the jury, on proper instructions, deter-
mines that issue of I can see no basis whatever in 
reason or common sense for an appellate court to hold that no 
issue of fact exists. 
'fhis court has in numerous cases stated \Yithout equivo-
cation that "Even ·where the facts are undisputed, if reason-
able minds might draw different conclusions upon the question 
ii04 )o!L\X I'. ( & ColT:'\TY OF 8AN FrtA2'iCfcWO [44 C.2d 
one of fact for the 
, 
154 Cal. 285 P. 
18D Cal. 268 P. 1006] ; 
Jfcrhcrf v. Southern Pac. 227 i P. ; Zibbell 
IGO Cal. 2:17 I 11G P. 513] ; see clis-
CaL2d 1 
P.2cl Can it be sait1 in tho ease 
that reasonable minds cannot draw different eon-
elusions from tho evidence eontainod in tho record in this 
case on the as to whether or not the necessary 
elements are to rise to the doctrine of last clear 
ehance? The answer to this question is obvious. That reason-
able minds have drawn different conclusions is demonstrated 
by the record before us. 'l1 he trial judge in the Doran case 
gaYc a last clear chance instrnction and the jury returned 
a \'erdict in faYor of plaintiff. The three members of the 
District Court of Appeal concluded that the evidence was 
sufficient to support a last clear chance instruction (Cal. 
App.), 274 P.2d 464, 275 P.2d 840, and three members of 
this conrt haYe arrived at the same conclusion. In view 
of this state of the record, it seems clear that the case is 
cleeided in accordance with the view of the majority because 
there are four members of this court who feel it should be 
so decided, and it must necessarily follow that all cases of 
this character will take the same course. The reasonable 
minds test which has been followed by this court and all 
other common law courts since time immemorial, is without 
force or effect so long as four members of this court see fit 
to arbitrarily conclude that the rule is not applicable to a 
case involving a particular factual situation to which they 
think the doctrine should not apply. 
'l'he majority opinion in this case is an outright usurpation 
of the fact finding function of the trial court in at least two 
particulars: ( 1) It is held that the elements necessary for 
application of the last clear chance doctrine were not present 
as a nutfc1· law; (2) it i,; hrld as a matter of la1v that the 
defendant did not have a last chance or a clear chance to 
avoid the accident. The nnsonndness of the majority opinion 
on these two points is clearly shown by tracing the steps in 
these cases. (The cases being joined in this appeal, and the 
evidence being substantially the same in each, the Doran case 
is outlined as the more graphic example.) (a) Evidence was 
presented on each of the two points stated above. (b) The 
trial judge, in the first instance, decided that these were 
19;");) l DOI<AN 1'. CITY & Coe~·ry ()!<' SAN r;1H.ANClSCO 505 
I 44 C.2d 477; 283 P.Zd 
therefore gave them to the jury for deter-
mination. The found certain facts to be true. (It 
is not necessary to detail the findings-the logic is the same 
in any case.) (d) The trial judge granted a new trial. (e) 
The three able of the District Court of Appeal unani-
decided that reasonable minds could differ on the 
evidence therefore reversed the order granting a 
new trial. (See Doran v. & County of Ban Francisco 
(Cal.App.), 274 P.2d 4()4, 275 P.2d 840.) (f) On appeal 
to this a majority of the court decides that reasonable 
minds conld not differ on the evidence presented, therefore 
affirms the order granting a new trial. As I pointed ont in 
my concurring opinion in Daniels v. City & County of San 
Francisco, supra, 40 Cal.2d 614, 628, by holding that reason-
able minds could not differ, the majority of this court is 
saying that the trial judge, the trial jury, the members of 
the District Court of Appeal, and their dissenting brethren 
on this court do not have reasonable minds. If the majority 
opinion says any less than this, then the problem is one of 
semantics. The law is clear; the logic is inescapable; the 
only possible rN~onci liation of the majority opinion and 
common sense must be found in divergence of opinion as to 
the meaning of the words used. The meaning which I attach 
to the words of the majority opinion shows to me that the 
majority opinion is illogical. 
This is not the first case of this sort to come before this 
court. Nor is this the first time that the majority has fol-
lowed this illogical course (see Rodabaugh v. Tekus, supra, 
39 Cal.2d 290; Go1e v. lJfa1ket Bt1eet Ry. Co., 4 Cal.2d 154 
[48 P.2d 2]; Young v. Southe1n Pac. Co., 182 Cal. 369 [190 
P. 36]). Nor is this the first time that I have expressed my 
views on this suhjeet v. O!scn, snpra, 38 Cal.2d 
102; dissenting opinions, Rodabaugh v. Tckus, supta, 39 Cal. 
2d 290; Sparks v. Reclinge1, ante, pp. 121, 126 [279 P.2d 971] ; 
eonrurring opinion. Daniels v. City cf County of Ban Fran-
cisco, supra, 40 Cal.2d 614; Recent Trends in Court Decisions 
in California, 5 Hast. L.J. 133). Unless we wish to repeal 
the portions of the Constitution of the United States and 
the Constitution of the State of California which guarantee 
the right to trial by jury, the result of this case must not be 
allowed to stand. 
I ·would commend to the majority of this court a reading 
of the history of the development of the jury system (e. g., 
,James B. 'fhayer, The Jury and Its Development, 5 Harv. 
:J06 & CorxTY OF SAx 
L.Rev. 249 ( 
answer 
trend of decisions in this court 
on this bench do not 
centuries of history which have 
seek a return to the feudal system or some other 
century form of judicial administration? 
I would also recommend to the majority, a and 
a reconsideration of the analysis of this was 
made in my dissenting opinion in 
39 CaL2d 290, 297, 303. The closing statement which I 
made there perfectly fits the situation in this case. ''I do 
not believe it can fairly and honestly be said that the record 
in this case presents a factual situation on which reasonable 
minds cannot differ. What has happened thus far demon-
strates beyond question that reasonable minds have arrived 
at different conclusions on the record before us. Such being 
the case, under the well-settled doctrine, the issue is one of 
fact and not of law, and hence should be determined the 
trier of fact-the jury in this case. 
''-while the majority opinion in this case will crrate 
confusion because it is in clear conflict with numerous other 
decisions of this court and the District Court of Appeal which 
I have cited hereinabove, of graver and more far-reaching 
eoncern is the problem that it is in direet Yiolation of the 
constitutional provision that 'the right of trial by jury shall 
be secured to all, and remain inviolate' ; (CaL Const., art. I, 
§ 7). It cannot be doubted that where a factual situation 
is presente\1 in a ease in whieh litigants are entitled to a 
jury trial as a matter of right, and the court takes the case 
from the jnry and decides as a matter of law that there is 
no issue of fact to be determined, the litigants have been 
deprived of a jury trial, and the Constitution has been vio-
lated. Such is the situation in the case at bar. While this 
result may seem to be unimportant in this case, it has an 
insidious impact on our whole constitutional structure. If 
judges who have taken a solemn oath to support the Con-





of these rules to a 
I think the d ifilculty 
California is now with 
the result of the disposition of some members 
the evidence and pass upon issues 
of fact. I have called attention to this situation in some of 
and opinions, and I intend to 
continue to talk about this matter whenever the opportunity 
as I feel that such a policy or practice is not only 
to settled principles of law but is placing an undue 
burden upon the members of the Supreme Court. However, 
I am to believe that so long as the personnel of the 
Court of California continues as it is prrsently con-
this or will continue. I am hopeful, 
however, that tJJe time may come when more consideration 
will be to the factual determinations of the trial courts 
in cases of this as I believe that it was the intention 
of the framers of the Constitution to place the burden of de-
issues of fact upon the trial courts and that such 
determinations should be by appellate courts. I 
am unable to reconcile the of the majority in this 
ease with this 
I believe in constitutional government. I believe in obey-
constitutional mandates. I believe that the people of 
this state have the to of the Justices of this 
court that \Vill their oath of office and support 
the Constitution of the United States and the Constitution 
of California, and I believe that when the Justices of this 
court decide that a party is not entitled to have a jury decide 
issues of fact in case in "\Vhich such party is entitled to a 
trial as a matter of right, they are not supporting the 
Constitution and are violating their oath of office. 
If a of this court can deny a litigant the right 
to a jury trial in one case, it can do it in a hundred cases 
or it can do it in ewry case. It can thereby abrogate the 
right to a trial. That situation almost existed during 
one in the history of this court in railroad crossing 
casrs. It has almost reachrd that point at the present time 





In the"e two eases, won1(1 the order and the judg-
meut 
GIBSON, C. and 'I'UAYNOll, ,J.-\Ve dissent. 
In our opu1wn tlw cYidenee was suflieieat to the 
of instnwtiolls ou the last dear cham~(' doetrine. 
' pl'tition for a 
19ii;i. 0 ibson, C. ,J.. 
opinion that the granted. 
[S. F. No. 19214. In Bank. Apr. 1955.] 
HOY A. SIIAHF':V' et al., Petitioners, v. THE STJPERIOil 
COURT OF TilE CITY AND COUNTY OF SAN 
1<-,HANCISCO, Respondent; BEI1F AST BEVERAGES, 
INC. (a Corporation), Real Party in Interest. 
[1] Mandamus- Acts and Duties Enforceable.--:\Iandamus will 
issue, ·where there is no plain, speedy and adequate remedy in 
ordinary course of law, to compel performance of act which 
law specifically enjoins or to compel admission of party to use 
and enjoyment of right to which be is entitled and from which 
he is unlawfully precluded. (Code Civ. Proc., §§ 1085, 1086.) 
[2] !d.-Existence of Other Remedy.-Since an order staying all 
proceedings in personn l injury action until plaintiff complies 
with order to submit to oral and physical examination in 
absencl' of her attorney is not appealable, and she does not 
havP any plain, speedy and in ordinary course 
of law, writ of mandnmus is available to test whether court 
hy its order has ·imposPd unlawful condition on plaintiff's right 
to proceed to trial. 
[3] Inspection-Physical Examination.-Colll't may order plaintiff 
in personal injury action to undergo physical examination by 
defendant's doctor, and doctor should he free to ask such 
questions as may be necessary to enable him to formulate in-
[1] See Cal.Jur., Mandamus, § 6 et seq.; Am.Jur., ::VIandamus, 
~54 et seq. 
[3] See Cal.Jur., Inspection and Physical Examination, § 4; Am. 
Jur., Discovery and Inspection, § 5 et seq. 
McK. Dig. References: [1] Mandamus, § 6; Mandamus, 
§ lil(6); [3, 4] Inspection,~§ 3, 4; [5] Inspection, 6: 
